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Abstract 
Extending Duverger's Law to electoral districts of arbitrary district magnitude would imply 
just one "extra" candidate running in each race. In this paper we analyze equilibrium properties 
(possible equilibrium configuration and then existence) of a plurality electoral system returning more 
than one legislator per district. We look at sincere Do�nsian voters and strategically behaving 
candidates (who can change their policy platforms at no cost, while new candidates can enter the 
race). In P�rt II we find empi�ical ev.idence in favor �f the implications of this analY.sis in the 
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performance of actual SNTV electoral systems, such as the one in Japan and Taiwan. 
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EQUILIBRIA WITH UNRESTRICTED ENTRY 
IN MULTI MEMBER DISTRICT PLURALITY (SNTV) ELECTIONS 
Part I: Theory 
Olga V. Shvetsova 
California Institute of Technology 
Political engineering in the form of designing democratic institutions is a growth 
industry, even among states that have a reasonably long history of democratic government 
(e.g., Italy, Israel). However, newly introduced forces of democratic competition can 
exacerbate the internal problems of some states, as when elections give _rise to ethnic 
parties that find it in their interest to raise the salience of divisive issues. But even those 
who disagree about specifics agree that institutional rules matter and that some rules are 
less problematical than others, depending on circumstances (see, for example, Lijphart 
1977 and-1984, Linz 1 990, Riker 1 982, Horowitz 1 99 1 ,  Shugart and Carey 1 992). And as 
long as the designing process occurs, we must strive to find those institutional 
arrangements that have the best chance of preventing conflict from wholly destabilizing 
a political system. 
As we and others argue elsewhere (Shvetsova and 'Filippov 1 993, Horowitz 1 985) the 
period prior to the formation of a coherent political party structure is the most dangerous 
stage of democratic, development, although once formed, the character and function of 
political parties becomes relatively predictablfi and stable. But whether a stable. 
democratic equilibrium is achieve at all depends on many things and that chief among 
them is the state's election laws and ethnic composition (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1 993, 
Horowitz 1991, Mainwaring 1 993). Thus, although we cannot model this dynamic process 
of party formation, the design of an electoral system requires that we understand better 
how election laws help generate a political party system of a specific type. In particular, 
of interest is the questipn of the principal ability of a specific electoral procedure to yield 
stable and predictable outcomes - in other words, to yield an equilibrium. 
To this end, this essay seeks to understand the nature of election competition fostered 
by a specific type of election system - the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) - that is 
used today in parliamentary elections in Japan and Taiwan. Our interest in this system is 
motivated by an evident empirical regularity that warrants theoretical explanation. 
Specifically, Reed's ( 1 990) analysis of Japanese elections to the lower House reveals the 
eventual emergence of k+l "serious" candidates in each of its k-member electoral districts. 
Cox ( 1 993) identifies Reed's findings as the "extension" of Du verger's Law ( 1 954) to 
plurality systems with multi-candidate electoral districts. By looking at the district-level 
electoral results, Reed concludes that 
in equilibrium, only k+l candidates compete in the Japanese SNTV 
system; 
over time the vote shares of these k+l candidates tend towards uniformity; 
although there is some evidence of strategic voter behavior, the process 
whereby this equilibrium is achieve appears to depend primarily on the 
ability of candidate (parties) to coordinate their actions; and 
convergence to.this equilibrium is slow, at least in Japan. 
The approach we take with respect to Reed's findings are both theoretical and 
empirical. The theoretical part of our analysis is devoted to studying the equilibrium 
properties of the SNTV system, when only the voters preferences are predetermined, but 
positions ·and the number of competing candidates are endogenous. It shows that in 
addition to k+l equilibria, there may also exist k-equilibria, depending on the specific 
form of the distribution of preferences. And for the special case of a uniform 
distribution of preferences, equilibria exist for any number of candidates greater than or 
equal to k. Also, we see that, except for the special case of a .uniform preference 
distribution, in equilibrium successful candidates should obtain uneven shares of the total 
vote. The reanalysis of Reed's data as well as data from Taiwan that we provide in the 
companion manuscript to this essay, moreover, shows that candidates achieve an 
equilibrium configuration relatively quickly - at least more quickly than Reed suggests -
and that if the support of candidates becomes more uniform over time, this is due largely 
to the actions of voters rather than to the positioning of the candidates on the issues. 
Ours is not the first theoretical anal ysis of SNTV.1 Cox ( 1 993), motivated specifically
by Reed's data, focuses on the analysis of the properties of the equilibria which SNTV 
yields. He offers a model of SNTV in which any number of candidates greater than k can 
compete and he approaches the problem from the standpoint of strategic voters rather 
1Denzau, Katz and Slutsky ( 1 985) analyze multi-candidate elections under various rules and
candidate objectives that admit of SNTV as a special case. But, in addition to assuming that 
preferences are uniformly distributed and that all voters are sincere, they are precluded from 
addressing Reed's empirical findings by the assumption that the number of candidates is determined 
exogenously. 
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than strategic candidates. Admittedly, his treatment has the advantage of not imposing 
any specific assumptions about the distribution of voter preferences (aside from assuming 
that there is at least one voter of any type) and of not restricting the issue space to any 
specific number of dimensions. On the other hand, a treatment that does not impose some 
geometry on the set of alternatives such as a spatial representation of issues cannot allow 
the candidates any strategic role. Thus, Cox assumes simply that there is a given number 
of candidates (some number greater than k) with fixed policy positions. Assuming that 
voters begin with a common knowledge assessment of the electoral prospects of each 
candidate, he then establishes that the rational expectations equilibrium has the first k 
candidates receiving equal vote shares and the remaining candidates receiving declining 
vote shares. 
In contrast to Cox, our approach is to take voters as sincere, with single-peaked 
preferences over a one-dimensional policy space, and to take candidates as strategic 
players who not only can move along the policy dimension, but can also enter the 
competiti.on in unlimited quantities if doing so yields each entrant a positive probability 
of winning a seat. Equilibrium is defined as a combination of policy positions and number 
of candidates such that 
all candidates have a positive probability of winning a seat, 
. no candidate, by altering his position; can increase his probability of 
winning a seat, and 
no new candidate can enter and by doing so receive a positive probability 
of winning a seat. 
When allowing an unlimited number of candidates to enter the race, we make the 
assumption that no candidate enters the race unless he obtains a positive probability of 
getting a seat immediately by doing so. Such an assumption rules out the entrants who, 
like Japan's Communist Party, often use the race as an opportunity for political 
propaganda, rather than to get into the Parliament. When assuming individual electoral 
gains for the entrant, we also prohibit anyone from entering the race merely to hurt some 
otherwise successful candidate. Based on the assumptions made, we show first that if more 
than one candidate can occupy the same policy position, then regardless of district 
magnitude, k, and the distribution of preferences (as long as there are no mass points), a 
k-equilibrium never exists, and that when /( x) is strictly quasi-concave there does not 
exist any equil ibrium number of competing candidates. 
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We then modify this structure by supposing that candidates must be spatially separated 
by some minimal distance. It is in this context that we establish the existence of the k and 
k+l equilibria. More specifically, for a broad class of electoral distributions we describe 
some of the necessary conditions for the existence of an equilibrium when entry is 
allowed, whereas for unimodal distributions we identify the form of that equilibrium. 
Briefly, 
for unimodal (quasi-concave) distributions of voter ideal points, if an 
equilibrium exists, it can only be a k  or a k+l equilibrium; 
a k+l equilibrium necessarily exists for all symmetric unimodal 
distributions; 
a k equilibrium exists for all symmetric and convex. p reference 
distributions and values of k of 1, 2, and 3; 
uniform distributions yield equilibria with any number of candidates if 
not less than k; and 
unless voters preferences are distributed uniformly, the vote shares of the 
k leading candidates do not have to be equal or similar, but the difference 
must be narrow for the kth and the k+Jll candidates.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 1 we off er some basic notation 
and outline the model's essential structure. In Section-2 we analyze the properties that an 
equilibrium must satisfy when candidates are allowed to occupy the same spatial position, 
and we use these properties to show that no· such equilibrium is pos.sible. In Section 3 we 
assume that candidates cannot get spatially closer than some minimal distance �, 
whereupon we establish the existence of various equilibria, depending on the distribution 
of preferences. Finally, in Section 4 we offer some testable propositions about 
competition in SNTV systems that we test through a reanalysis of Reed's data and data 
from Taiwan in Part II of this essay. 
l. The Basic Model
Among the systems of proportional representation, SNTV is one that allows a relatively 
unambiguous definition of candidate objectives. The goal of a candidate is to win a seat, 
and for that he must score above the k+l 8t best competitor. Aside from this, objectives
such as maximization of vote share or rank are irrelevant considerations. And since under 
SNTV there are but three possibilities for a candidate - ( 1 )  he receives a seat with 
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certainty; (2) he receives a seat with some positive probability less than one; and (3) his 
probability of being elected is zero - we assume that candidates maximize the probability 
of winning a seat. 
That we focus on individual candidates rather than political parties is not merely a 
matter of convenience. In theory, the treatment of parties as strategic players should be 
different from_ the treatment of candidates. Some studies show (Balinski and Young 1 982) 
that when parties are many, no voting system guarantees that the increase in the party's 
share of vote would not lead to the decrease of its share of legislative seats. Thus, a 
candidate's probability of winning a seat may not always be monotone with his party's 
vote share. One can still suppose that when elections are conducted in a large (such as 
national) district, there is no conflict in the objectives of party leaders a_nd a party's 
candidates once the party list has been compiled, and it is reasonable to assume that both 
maximize vote share. However, within a local electoral district it is often the case, that the 
number of seats subject to allocation is comparable to the number of parties, represented 
in the race. Therefore, it might as well be party strategy to promote few individual 
candidates within the district, even if the system is not SNTV. It may be rational, hence, 
for parties maximizing the sum of seats won across all districts, to assume the objective 
function of its candidates running within the districts. Of course, as long as the ballot 
structure requires voters to choose between parties, not candidates, we can at best look for 
similarities between the parties' and candidates' incentives within the district, but cannot 
substitu�e candidates for parties as active _players in t_he formulation of the model. 
Things are different under SNTV. We clearly cannot suppose that a party can 
maximize its share of seats by merely maximizing the summed vote share of its candidates 
(Cox and Niou 1993). A party's candidates can split the vote in a district in ways that 
preclude any of them from winning a seat. Whereas if they coordinate their support or if 
fewer of them run, several of them might secure seats even if their smaller number 
decreases the party's overall share of the vote. Under SNTV, then, a natural harmony of 
interests between party leaders and potential candidates puts the interests of political 
candidates first. 
What strengthens the role of individual candidates even more, is that SNTV is an 
election system that operates exclusively at the local level - without the at-large district 
or allocation by remainders. There is, then, a strong local component to legislative 
elections in both Taiwan and Japan in which candidates are the key players and parties 
are merely the non-binding coordinating entities that negotiate on behalf of the 
candidates before elections and facilitate legislative structure afterwards. Indeed, in 
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Taiwan, for example, it is not unusual to find members of the Kuomintang running in an 
election against other KMT members without official party sanction. Thus, our analysis 
assumes that under SNTV the key strategic players are candidates rather than parties. We 
emphasize, however, that this focus does not preclude us from discussing the role of 
parties in SNTV systems. In particular, considerable coordination may be required to 
preclude entry or to otherwise prevent an unintended supply of candidates. In fact, the 
model that we suggest here rationalizes the evolution of the extensive cooperation between 
the "parties" at the district level, that is so typical of the Japanese political system, even 
if it takes place under the label of "factional politics". 
Turning now to more formal matters, we begin by assuming that candidates locate 
themselves somewhere on a one-dimensional policy space, R, and that voters _have single­
peaked preferences in this space corresponding to the usual Euclidean distance model 
(Enelow and Hinich 1 984) so that the distribution of voters ideal points, f(x), is
continuous and contains no mass points. The electoral rule is plurality in a k-member 
districts (SNTV). Thus, the k candidates with the largest vote shares each win a seat and 
ties are broken by coin tosses. Insofar as candidate motives are concerned, we assume that 
each candidate, actual or potential, maximizes his or her probability of winning a seat. 
In contrast to Cox (I 993 ), we assume that voters vote sincerely for the candidate closest 
to their ideal (tossing coins if indifferent), but that ·candidates are strategic in their 
selection of policy platforms. Entry is allowed, but a new candidate enters only if he can 
. secure a non-zero probability of winning a seat. Existing candidates must choose their 
positions under the threat that new opponents might enter the contest. 
Developing this structure further requires some additional notation. Briefly, we let 
c 
x 
Ix; +x;-1 I 1 =l·= ----X1 l 2 
lx.+x. ii I =I·= 1 i+ X1 l 2 
a finite set of candidates, where i, j, ... , v E C;
the position of candidate i in the policy space; 
the vector of candidate positions, (xi' x2, ... , xv) 
the number of candidates at the policy position of 
candidate i; 
the left-most ideal point of voters 
who most prefer candidate i; 
the right-most ideal point of voters 
who most prefer candidate i; 
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the proportion of voters who most pref er xi. Also, lets� 
be the proportion of voters to the left of xi who most pref er xi and 
s� .. sxJ - s� (since /(x) has no mass points, we need not concern
ourselves with anyone who might most pref er x1). 
s. = ...!. s candidate i's share of the vote,· 
i ni XJ
s1 = sxJ = [ lxJ; rxJl the interval of policy positions that are closer to xi than any other
candidate position; 
Pi(x) candidate i's probability of winning a seat, where Pi = P; 
if xi = Xj· Note that pi > pj only if Si > sj .. 
Finally, an equilibrium (x,C) to the election game with k seats at stake is a v-element
vector x and a set C of v candidates such that
a. no new candidate can enter and, ceteris paribus, secure a non-zero
probability of winning a seat; and
b. no candidate i e C can unilaterally alter his position and increase P1; and
c. Pi > for all candidates in C.
2. The Model When Two or More Candidates Can Occupy the Same Policy Platform 
We can now prove several l�minata that characterize ·the properties - in terms of
number and location of candidates - that any equilibrium (x,C) must possess. We
emphasize at the outset, however, that we offer these lemma ta to establish that, unless we 
impose some additional restrictions on the candidate's positions (specifically, unless we 
preclude the possibility of two or more candidates adopting the same policy platform), no 
equilibrium exists. Admittedly, there may be easier routes to prove non-existence, but· 
the method we offer here paves the way to establishing existence when candidates are 
constrained to adopt distinct positions. First, then, 
Lemma 1: If (x,C) is an equilibrium, then,
1. Pi equals either 1, or 0, or a (0 < a < 1) for all i in C (if both Pi and Pj
are not equal to 1, but greater than 0, then both are equal to a, where a 
is some positive number less than one).
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2. if ni � 2 and Pi > 0, then Pi < 1. (a candidate can receive a seat with
certainty only if he or she stands alone at a policy position).
3. if Pi > 0 then ni � 2 (not more than two candidates will occupy the same
policy position and still have a chance to win).
4. if ni = 2 and Pi > 0, then s
� 
= s�
5. ni = 2 only if for all a such that R1 =x1+a € [x1_1; x1•1] , and a > 0
f rk1 f(x) dx < 2Jx1•1 f(x) dx, 
r .. , x, 
and for a < 0 
6. For all xi and xi, if 111 = nj = 2 and Pi, Pj > 0, then Bx,= sxJ (paired
candidates everywhere have support of the same size).
7. if ni = I and P1 < I,  then for all a such that R1 =x1+a € [x1_1; x1•1] , and
a> 0
and for a < 0 
8. if n1 = I and P1 = I, and if there exists a candidate j in C such that Pi = a, 
then
si < sx, < 2si and s� < si; s� < si.
9. no two adjacent policy positions x1 and xj in x can be located so that there
exists an interval [a, b] in the interval [x1, xj] such that
la - bl .$ lx1 - xp2 
and 
where Smin is the vote share of a candidate with the lowest positive
probability of winning a seat. 
The proof of Lemma I is in the Appendix. 
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At this point it is perhaps useful to say something about ties. Unlike models in which 
voters are strategic (Cox 1993, Palfrey 1 989, Myerson and Weber 1 989), a tie here is not 
a "knife-edged" case involving a single voter. We are not concerned with ties as an 
electoral outcome but with the candidate's estimates of their electoral prospects. Even if 
candidates possess perfect knowledge about preferences and candidate positions, a 
candidate's electoral support remains a random variable subject to determination by such 
things as variations in turnout (which we do not model) and vote counting errors. In this 
event a tie in a candidate's calculations becomes a robust possibility. 2 
Our next lemma establishes a restriction on the location of the paired candidates in the 
case, when more than one seat is allocated through the tie (i.e. for example five candidates 
are tied for three seats), and Lemma 3 says that if the distribution of pr:eferences is 
single-peaked, the tie can occur for not more than just one seat out of k. 
Lemma 2: If (x,C) is an equilibrium, if IPi • 1 1  < k - I (if a tie occurs for more
th.an one seat), and if there is an xi in x such that n1 = 2 (say candidates i and j),
then for all CJ such that �1 =x1 +CJ E [x1_1; x1•1] , , if CJ > 0
and for CJ < 0
Proof: If more than one seat is allocated by breaking ties, then at least three candidates 
must be tied. Since, from Lemma 1 .2, candidates i and j 'win a seat with probability less 
than 1 and since, from Lemma 1.1, all tied candidates win a seat with the same 
probability, a, then there exists a third candidate, say t, such that P1 = P; =Pt. So the
candidate who increases his share of the vote wins a seat for certain. So, by deviating 
from xi, candidate i secures the vote share
2 And derived later from the model, this possibility should also be consciously reinforced by
the actions of the strategic candidates themselves. Namely, in order to prevent further entry, "safe" 
candidates are interested in maintaining competition somewhere along the policy space. Because they 
do not care so much about keeping their excess votes, "safe" candidates can afford to maintain proper 
distances from "weak" candidates, in order to preserve or generate a tie between them for the sake of 
a mutually beneficial no-entry_ balance. 
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Hence, if the conditions of the lemma are not satisfied, a deviation increases i's vote 
share. Although j's share may also increase, t's cannot increase, so i wins a seat for 
certain, and (x,C) cannot be an equilibrium. QED
Lemma 3: If the distribution of preferences, f(x), is strictly quasi-concave, then 
in equilibrium, at most one seat can be allocated through a tie, i.e., 
IPi = II � k - l .  
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that IP1 • 1 1  < k - l .  Then,
a. from Lemma 2, for all xi in x such that ni =2 , the mode of f(x), m(f), is
in sx1• Hence, there does not exist an xJ such that x1 "x1, n1 = n1 = 2 • .
That is, there can be only one set of paired candidates.
b. for all xj in x such that ni = 1 and 0 < Pi < 1 ,  it follows from the single­
peakedness of f(x) and Lemma 1.7 that m(f) e sx1• Hence, there does not
exist an xj in x such that x1 "x1, n1=_n1=1,. That is, there can be at
most one candid'ate in C who does noi receive a seat with certainty. 
c. From (a) and (b) it follows that
Hence, 
8x1EXs.t. ri1·= l,O < P1 < l}• .
ft! xi E z s. t. xi "x1, ni s: 2 , o < P1 < 1}
1. there does not exist an x1 e x such that 111 = l, 0 < P1 < 1 ,
2. if there is an i e C such that 0 < Pi < 1, then there must be two such
candidates who are paired at x1, 
3. (1) and (2) together imply that 1Pi = 11 � k - 1, as at most one seat can be
allocated through a tie. QED
It follows immediately from this lemma that, 
Corollary 1: If (x,C) is an equilibrium, f(x) is strictly quasi-concave, then 
I Cl � k+l, as by Lemma 3, at most one seat can be allocated
through the tie, and at most two candidates can be tied for it. 
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Lemmata l through 3 now allow us to establish a non-existence result when no 
restrictions are placed on the candidates spatial positions. 
Proposition 1: Under the assumptions of the model, for any distribution of voters' 
ideal points and any k. IP1 ==1 I < k, i.e., no k-equilibrium exists.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that IP1 =11 = k. But then for any established
candidate i e c, PJ = � > o, where jfC, x1=xJ. Hence entry will occur, and (x,C)
cannot be an equilibrium. QED
Proposition 1, though, does not rule out the possibility of equilibria with more 
than k candidates. To that end, suppose f( x) is quasi-concave (unimodal). Then, 
Proposition 2: If the distribution of voters' ideal poims is quasi-concave, then under 
the assumptions of the model no equilibrium ( x.C) exists. 
Proof: By Proposition 1, jP1 .. ll < k, - :liec� .s. t. O<P1<1. By Lemma 3 - for
f(x) quasi-concave, jo <P1 <11=2, while both tied candidates are located in the same
position. Hence, in equilibrium there cannot be other than k+l. candidates, k-1 of wh�ch. . 
receive 
·
seats with certainty, and two oth�rs (suppos�. candidates i and j) are tied for a
single seat. By Lemma 1.4. s� = s�. Hence
R f,XJ+.!! 1 L f,X1+.!!. 'v't»O, 3a:<!:6, s.t. Sx•a�Sx1- 2f(x)d(x)>-{Sx1+ 2f(x)dx}.J � 2 � 
In other words, by hurting at once both candidates i and j, the entrant receives more than 
what is left to each of the tied candidates. So such an entrant receives a seat with 
certainty, which implies that entry occurs and ( x,C) is not an equilibrium.QED
3. The Model when Candidates Must Maintain Some Minimal Separation
The nonexistence result for the unimodal case presented above is driven by the
assumption that two or more candidates can run on indistinguishable platforms. Instead, 
we may want to introduce a minimal distance t>, that must separate any two candidates 
1 1  
in the policy space.8 Lemma 5, therefore, is similar to Lemma 1 ,  in its listing of the
conditions that must hold in an equilibrium, if it exists. 
Lemma S: If no two candidates can adopt spatial positions that are closer than 6, 
and if ( x.C) is an equilibrium for any small 6, then,
1 .  Lemma 1 . 1  holds. 
2. If IP1=1 I= k, i.e. if all candidates receive seats with certainty, then
'Vi, S�+ [F(x1+ �) -F(x1)] > s:i- [F(xi+ � )-F(x1)]
and 
That is, no candidate i can be located further from the median of his 
support m1, than �. (Suppose not. Then new candidate j can either win 
a seat, or tie with candidate i for it, if j enters at x1 +6 .) 
3. Lemma 1.7 holds, when modified as follows: If there exists candidate i,
such that P1 < 1, then for
4. Lemma 1.8 holds.
5. Lemma 1.9 holds.
or 
either 
Note, that Lemma 5.2 hints at the possibility of a k-equilibrium. We want to 
explore this possibility further here. No general result with respect to a k-equilibrium's 
existence or non-existence has been established so far. Its existence depends not only on 
the form of the distribution of voters' ideal points and the size of the district (k), but in 
certain cases - on the size of (> as well (equilibrium may disappear with the decrease of 
the o parameter, while existing for its greater values). As the rest of our discussion here
3 Provided, that nowhere in the distribution is s=2l> associated with positive probability of
winning, w hich for some t> is always true by the continuity of the distribution and finiteness of an 
integral. 
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is aimed to establishing the results for 6 arbitrarily small, we present only one particular 
case of k-equilibrium existence, which fits this requirement: 
Proposition 3: For any concave and symmetric distribution of voters preferences 
when k=l. 2, or 3, k-equi/ibria exist for any small 6. 
Proof: In order to prove the result for any small 6, we need to show that all k 
candidates can be positioned exactly at their respective means, and that none of them gets 
a twice smaller share of the vote than another (by L.5.2, and L. 1 .9). Because the cases of 
k=l and k=2 are trivial, consider kr=3 and locate the middle candidate x2 at the mode of 
the distribution. Choose 12, such that 
f12f(x) dx= f"1f(x) dx, 1l2-x1 I = lx2-l2 IJx1 Jo 
Note, that such an 12 always exists. Now we want to show that s1R > � S2L in order to
assure, that the middle candidate has less than twice more votes than the candidate on the 
left. If we show this for the linear slope, it must hold for any other slope of a concave 
distribution. The vote share of the first candidate on his left by construction is equal to 
that on his right, i.e. 
where 
a•b= .!.(a+A4) •(b+Ab) i .e. a•b=a•A4+b•Ab+A4*Ab, 2 
·a=x1·, b=f(x�)
a+A4=12, b+Ab .. f(12). 
Thus, as we have to show that sf < 2s2L, and we know, that
Hence, 
QED 
The following proposition shows that for the special case of a uniform distribution 
of voter ideal points, for all values of k equilibria exist for any number of candidates 
greater than or equal to k. 
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Proposition 4: If f(x) - U[0,1] , then 't/ k 3 equilibria (x,C) such that ICI �k. 
Proof: We prove the existence simply by presenting the examples of equilibria for 
all cases describing I Cl �k. Specifically,
I) for ICl>2k odd, let xJ.= �l;j 't/iEC, xi.Ex;
I I 
· h l 21-1 2) for c � 2k even, eit er et xJ. = 2lCf,
O r  let v. - 2i-1 l> and v.  - i + l>.""11. I od� 21Cf - 2 ·-u I •wnl - icr 2 • 
3) for 2k> IC l >k any combination of certain and tied candidates is possible,
including the arrangement described in ( J ). 
Lemma 6: If ( x,C) is an equilibrium, if f(x) is strictly quasi-concave, and if there 
e x i s t s a c a n d i d a t e i€C, s u c h  t h a t  O<P1=u<l, t h e n
3f s. t. lx1-xjl =f:i,Pj=P1=a. and axgmaxf(x) € {s1Usj}.
Proof: By Lemma 5.3, if such a candidate i exists, it must either be located so that 
argmaxf(x) €sxi • or be blocked from above by another candidate , say i+l, such that
lx1+1 - X1 I = {). As at least two candidates must have a probability of winning a seat less
than one, than at least one such candidate must be "blocked" from above. 
If a candidate i is blocked from ·above, he must be blocked by i+l such that 
O < P1•1 = P1 <1. Suppose otherwise. !hen Pi+l= 1. B ut by definition, Si.±.!-Si = M, where 
M is some number strictly greater than 0. Then for any .eligible distribution /( x) there 
exists l> •, such that
Note, that Jx1•1-x11 = l> .  Hence ,  an entrant at x i+i+ ll receives a seat with certainty, and
( x.C) is not an equilibrium. 
But then P1•1<1, and by Lemma 5.3 it must be that argmax f (x) € s1•10 which
implies that JO<P1<ll =2, Jx1•1-x1l=f:i, and 
and 
a l>-o 0 F(xJ.+ 2 )-F(xi
+-2-) � F(lx)-F(lx1
-2),
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F(xi+i + o-&) -F(xi+i -i) 2 F(rx +�) -F(rx ) , 2 2 J•l 2 J+1 
Hence, as f(x) is strictly quasi-concave, lxJ and rxJ.1 straddle the mode and 
argmaxf(x) E{siUs.1+1L QED 
Two corollaries follow immediately from Lemma 6, 
Corollary 2: If f(x) is quasi-concave, and if (x,C) is an equilibrium, then 
ICI �k+l, and IP1=ll =k-1. 
Corollary 3: If f(x) is. quasi-concave, and if (x,C) is an equilibrium, and if there 
exists i, such that O<Pi<l ,  then Pi= 1 /2. 
We are now positioned to prove the central result of this section of the paper -
Proposition 5: !. For any strictly quasi-concave distribution of ideal points, if there
are equilibria other than k-equilibrium existing for all small chO, they must be of
the following form: 
- lei =k+1; 
- two candidates are located maximally close to each other, the union of their 
constituencies includes the mode of the distribution, and these two candidates are 
tied f01"a seat: 
- the remaining k-1 candidates each receive a seat with certainty and are located 
so. that Lemma 5 holds. 
II. For all symmetric single-peaked distributions and for all odd k's (and some
even), such equilibria exist for any small & > O. 
Proof: Part I of the proposition follows directly from Lemma 6 and Corollaries 2 
and 3 - for a quasi-concave distributions no other equilibria with I cl > k may exist. Part 
II is proved by the construction of the corresponding equilibrium. 
Since the case of k= I is trivial, we start with k=3. For (> small enough, set 
x1 = argmaxf(x) - �, xi = argmaxf(x) + � 
Now on (00; x1] we need to choose 11 to separate the constituencies of candidates i and 
i-1 so that 
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l rx1-1I = lx1-l1I :i: � 
Notice, that the choice of 11 uniquely determines x1• By the strict monotonicity of f(x) 
on (oo;x1J. 
If in particular we choose 11 such that 
F(x1) -F(11) = F(x1_1 =x1-2 jx1-11 D 
the conditions of Lemma 5 are satisfied. But by the strict monotonicity of f(x) on 
(oo; x1J such an I always exists: F(x1) -F(l1) is continuous, monotonically decreasing
from o.s-�(6) to 0 as �1 goes from 0 to x1- � , while F(x1_1=x1-2lx1-:1.D is
continuous, monotonically increasing from 0 to o.s-� (6) . Therefore, there existsli 
such that F(x1> -F(li> • F(x1_1). Finally, by symmetry, locate xJ•i at F-1 (l-F(x1_1)), 
so that ( (x1_1,x1,xJ,xJ.1) ,{1,2,3,4}) constitutes a (k+l}-equilibrium for k=3.
To construct an equilibrium for k=5, choose x1 and xJ as before. From our 
previous argument we know that the choice of 1j_1 separating the constituencies of 
candidates i-1 and i-2 uniquely determines the choice of 1; and, hence, x1_1 andx1_2 
(see Figure I). And again, for the same reason as in 01e case of k=3, we want the choice 
of 11·-1 to satisfy 
The existence of such 11·_1 is again asserted by a fixed-point argument. The theorem holds 
because this method of construction can be extended to any odd k". QED
4. Implications of the Model that Admit Empirical Testing 
That Reed's ( 1990) work documents the stability of the k+l pattern in Japan is an
encouraging fact. Indeed, although our analysis asserts the existence of a k+J-equilibrium 
only for symmetric and unimodal distributions of voters' preferences, there clearly exists 
in each particular case a large set of equilibrium spatial configurations with the same 
number of candidates. For this reason we can speculate that symmetry is not a strict 
-4 The reason we do not claim the uniqueness of an equilibrium for any particular value of k, 
is the arbitrariness of the choice of x1andxJ, for which the only restrictions are
argmax f (x) E {s 1UsJI and that Lemma 5.3 holds.
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requirement. For small variations in a symmetric distribution there must still exist a 
subset of configurations that remain equilibria. At  the same time, if we relax the 
restriction that the number of candidates to the right of the mode equal the number to the 
left, we suspect that for any unimodal distribution (no matter how asymmetric) there 
exists a district size k for which a k+l-equilibrium exists. Thus, the preconditions for 
testing our analysis are not necessarily as strong as the assumptions vis-a-vis symmetry 
that we employ in proving our formal results. 
The next precondition to empirical testing is to establish that the assumption of 
a unimodal preference distribution provides a reasonable characterization of individual 
districts. Fortunately, extremely high ethnic and linguistic homogeneity in both Taiwan 
and Japan allows us to suppose that constituencies are unlikely to be polarized along these 
lines. Japan's districts, moreover, are quite small (3-5), as are Taiwan's (with but a few 
notable exceptions), thereby giving us some confidence in the validity of the unimodality 
assumption. That those exceptions (i.e., Taipei and Kaoshung) are also likely to be the 
most heterogeneous districts provides a basis for seeing whether the k+l rule holds better 
in homogeneous than heterogeneous election districts. Of course, even taking all this into 
account, we still cannot claim that the empirical analysis that follows in Part II of this 
essay is a rigorous test of our model - rather it is merely a piece of empirical evidence in 
support of it. 
Insofar as specific hypotheses are concerned, both Reed's empirical and Cox's 
theoretical analysis agree that the vote shares of the candidates.should be approximately. 
the same. Reed asserts this hypothesis for all k+l candidates. Cox, by approaching the 
problem from the standpoint of voters' rationality, derives that only the top k candidates 
should all receive identical vote shares, and the k+Jll arid lower ranked candidates get
arbitrarily lower shares of the vote. In contrast, our analysis predicts that candidates in 
equilibrium do not necessarily secure equal electoral support. Although over time their 
support may become even as Reed reports, this trend should be the result of strategic 
voting rather than of any strategic action by the candidates. 
An empirical assessment of this hypothesis, though, requires a reconsideration of how 
we count candidates - the number of "serious" candidates competing in each district. 
Reed's ( 1990) approach is not satisfactory for our needs. Reed equates the number of 
candidates to the number of "effective" candidates, i.e. the inverse of the sum of the 
candidates' squared shares of the vote. Although the motivation for the use of "effective" 
number of candidates is to avoid separating "serious" candidates from non-serious ones 
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by some ad hoc criterion, the use of this measure involves a number of unsatisfactory 
assumptions. In particular, testing the hypothesis of k+l candidates running in a district 
by looking at "effective" number of candidates implies that all such candidates earn 
identical support from voters in equilibrium. If there are indeed only k+l candidates, but 
with uneven shares of the vote, the "effective" number will be below k+l. Conversely, for 
"effective" number to be k+l when vote shares differ, more than k+l candidates must 
compete. Indeed, Reed does assert that in equilibrium all candidates should be equally 
successful at the polls. Looking merely at the "effective" number of candidates makes it 
impossible to test this part of his hypothesis and confounds the influence of several 
hypotheses. 
Unlike Reed, we will not compute "effective" numbers of candidates, but instead 
will draw a line rather arbitrarily, cutting off those unsuccessful candidates whose vote 
shares are "significantly" lower than the candidates' immediately above them. To avoid 
obvious criticism, the cut-off will be set at a 20% vote decrease, 33%, 50%, and 1 00 
percent. In other words, we count the number of candidates in the district as k plus all 
those candidates, who gathered not less than 80 (67, 50, or 0) percent of the vote of the 
competitor immediately above them. For example, if the kth candidate receives 100,000
votes, and 
k+Jll receives 79,000, · 
k+2nd receives 52,000,
k+3rd rece:�ves 25,000,
and the last one, the k+4th, only 10 votes, the number of "serious" candidates in the district
will be k, k+l, k+2, and k+4 correspondingly for the 20, 33, 50 and I 00 percent cut-offs. 
Insofar as attempting to see whether a candidate--oriented analysis (our) provides
a better explanation of the data than does a voter-oriented explanation (Cox, and Reed), 
we must look as some additional things. Because Reed predicts that there should be k+l 
"serious" candidates per district and since we predict either k or k+l such candidates, we 
cannot use simple counts to discriminate between Reed's analysis and our own. Moreover, 
Cox does not infer any predictions about the number of candidates. He states only that 
all victorious candidates should obtain identical shares of the vote. We can, though, get 
a handle of discriminating between the two alternative approaches by looking at the ratios 
of the candidates' vote shares within districts. Specifically, 
Cox's hypothesis can be restated as predicting that the ratio of the vote 
shares of the k-Jll candidate and the Jll candidate being close to I.
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Our analysis predicts that the corresponding ratio of the k+J!! to the k!h
being close to I .  
Reed's hypothesis predicts that both ratios should be  1 .  
In Part II  o f  this essay we analyze the complete set o f  Taiwanese elections and reexamine 
the electoral data from Japan assembled by Reed with these hypotheses in mind. However 
in the Addendum to this paper we present a partial set of Taiwanese elections, to provide 
evidence immediately that our hypothesis is worth consideration. 
Finally, we want to offer several comments on the how our analysis might be used 
to shed light on the potential rational grounds for the party formation under SNTV. One 
widely held opinion is that for party membership to be individually rational for the 
candidates, it must be significantly reducing campaigning costs, or otherwise 
strengthening the candidates positions with the voters (Holler, 1 987). Alternatively, 
Downs's political party does not yield benefits to members on an individual basis, but 
instead collects them "lump-sum," in the form of the control over the government, which 
serves as a kind of public good for party members. A political party, then, is but "a team
seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted 
election", "whose members agree on all their goals instead of just part of them" (Downs, 
1957 p.25). 
In contrast, our analysis suggests the concept of a patty as a coordinating agent among 
candidates. That is, the particular difficulty candidates confront in an SNTV system is 
being certain that o�ly the "correct'.' numper. of
. them comp.ete, and that they comp�te at
the "correct" positions on the issue space. Notice now that this perspective admits of the 
existence of factions within parties and the free use of faction labels in a campaign. The 
phenomenon of factions, of course, is not foreign to either the Japanese or the Taiwan 
political systems. 
Specific aspects of intra- and inter-party coordination include, for example, Curtis' 
( 1972) and Reed's ( 1990) observation in the Japanese system of (for example) "the young
entrepreneur ... [who] r.uns as an independent to demonstrate his campaigning ability to the 
[major party) in the hope that they will reward him with nomination" (Reed 1990, p, 355). 
Japanese parties also tend to grant their "joint" nomination to independent candidates -
something that hints of the attention given by parties to defining the "spatial" location of 
a candidate. Cases of collusion between the parties in terms of vote transfers are also 
common. 
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Notice moreover that our treatment of parties in fact corresponds to Schumpeter's 
famous definition of party and machine politicians as "simply the response to the fact that 
the electoral mass is incapable of actions other than a stampede, and they constitute the 
attempt to regulate polit ical competition exactly similar to the corresponding practice of 
trade associations" (Schumpeter, 1 947 p.283). Owing to the complexity of the equilibrium 
our model describes - a complexity that requires the right number of candidates at the 
right spatial locations - it seems only reasonable to view parties in SNTV systems as both 
agents of coordination as well as of enforcement. 
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ADDENDUM: 
The table below shows the dynamics of candidate participation in three 
consecutive Taiwanese national elections - 1 980, 1 983, and 1 986 - prior to the drastic 
change of electoral laws that occurred in 1 989 (26 electoral districts were formed in place 
of 8, with average district magnitude reduced from 6.9 to 4.6). Columns 4, 5, and 6 of the 
table show the number of "serious" candidates in excess of k competing in the race within 
districts for the three cut-off levels specified above. Column 8 gives the ratio of the 
support for the k-Jll leading candidate to that of the first-ranked candidate - statistics
that should converge to 1 by both Reed's and Cox's hypotheses. Column 9 reports the ratio 
of the vote for the strongest loser (the k+Jli candidate) to that of a last victor (the k!h
candidate), which should converge to l by both Reed's hypothesis and our$ (except for 
the k-equilibrium cases). The data on this set of elections are interesting in particular 
because, with opposition to the Kuomintang illegal during this period, there has been no 
process of party formation during the time covered by the data in this table. This data, 
then, del'.ives from a period of minimal coordination during a campaign (when, for 
example, the total number of candidates exceeded the number of seats in the district 2 to 
4 times). 
Looking at the numbers this table reports, we see that, as predicted by our model 
(except for the clearly expressed cases of k-candidate competition - the Third district in 
1983; the Sixth district in 1 980, 1 983,  and 1 986; and the Eighth district in 1 980 and 1986), 
the ratio .of the vote for the first loser and t.he last winner stays close to 1 ,  beginning with 
the f irst elections. The average for the year 1 980 is 0.89, for the year 1 983, 0.94, and for 
the year 1 986, 0.93. At the same time and contrary to Reed and Cox's analyses, the 
numbers in column 8 stay far from 1 (averaging 0.55 in ·1 980, 0.76 in 1 983, and 0.65 in 
1986). Of course, we cannot say whether this ratio would converge to l over a longer 
period (as Reed claims based on his analysis of Japan). But these data do encourage us to 
examine the Japanese case more closely for support of the hypothesis that the "k+l rule" 
is driven more by candidate and party strategies than by individually motivated voters 
voting strategically. 
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DISTRICT LEVEL ELECTORAL DYNAMICS IN TAIWANESE GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1980- 1986 
District Year District Number of "serious" candidates Total Ratio of the vote 
magnitude in excess of k when cutoff is number of 
k when the vote reduces by candidates 
20% 33.3% 50% k- l st/ I -st k+l st/k-th 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
l 1980 8 2 3 3 2 1  0.6 158 0.9736 
1983 9 2 2 2 22 0.545 1 0.9776 
1986 9 I 3 3 1 7 0.5826 0.9976 
2 1980 6 0 5 1 2  1 8  0.4657 0.7792 
1983 6 2 4 6 1 6  0.7747 0.9027 
1986 6 2 2 2 1 1 0.6335 0.9859 
3 1980 9 1 I 5 22 0.5559 0.9357 
1983 9 0 0 0 17  0.6829 0.4749 
1986 10 1 1 2 1 7  0.4668 0.9486 
4 1980 8 2 5 14 23 0.4 1 69 0.9 1 72 
1983 8 2 2 2 20 0.6863 0.9998 
· 1986 9 2 ._4 -4 20 0.6055 0.8387 
5 1 980 5 1 1 3 1 1 0.7576 0.856 
1 983 5 1 1 2 1 0  0.6254 0.9904 
1 986 5 2 2 2 8 0.8556 0.8094 
6 1980 2 0 0 2 6 0.7 103 0.5677 
1983 2 0 0 0 5 0.9 156 0.4735 
1986 2 0 0 0 2 0.857 1 0 
7 1980 8 2 2 25 33 0.337 1 0.932 
1983 8 2 2 8 25 0.5305 0.9484 
1986 8 2 2 2 1 6 0.574 0.9885 
8 1980 5 0 0 7 1 6  0.5622 0.5435 
1983 5 2 3 5 17  0.742 0.8473 
1986 6 0 0 0 1 1 0.5968 0.3742 
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DISTRICT LEVEL ELECTORAL COMPETITION IN TAIWANESE GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1 989 
District District Number of "serious" candidates in Total Ratio of the vote 
magnitude excess of k when cutoff is when the number of 
k vote reduces by candidates 
20% 33% 50% k- l st/ 1 -st k+l st/k-th 
1 1 1 5 7 7 29 0.566 0.9 1 4  
2 2 0 1 1 4 0.5 1 3  0.768 
3 1 0 0 0 2 1 .000 0.346 
4 5 1 1 1 8 0.60 1 0.9 10
5 1 0 2 2 3 1 .000 0.793 
6 1 1 1 1 6 1 .000 0.959 
7 2 2 2 2 4 0.574 0.846 
8 4 2 2 2 1 2  0.974 0.982 
9 3 3 3 3 1 2  0.956 0.980 
J O  4 2 2 2 1 3  0.523 0.949 
1 1 2 0 2 2 7 0.984 0.7 1 0  
1 2  3 1 1 · 1 7 0.37 1  0.959 
1 3 2 1 1 1 6 0.663 0.959 
1 4  1 0 ·o 0 3· 1 .000 ·0.4 1 8
1 5  4 0 0 0 10 0.85 1 0.271 
1 6  2 0 3 3 9 0.997 0.684 . 
1 7  4 1 2 2 8 0.566 0.894 
1 8 3 0 0 0 6 0.52 1 0.423 
1 9  1 0 0 0 2 1 .000 0.3 1 8  
20 1 1 1 1 4 1 .000 0.803 
2 1  1 0 0 0 6 1 .000 0.3 1 7  
22 6 2 3 3 20 0.3 1 6  0.963 
23 6 0 2 2 1 7  0.639 0.695 
24 4 1 1 1 13  0.643 0.988 
25 4 2 2 2 1 1 0.643 0.939 
26 I 0 0 1 4 1 ;000 0.602 
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DISTRICT LEVEL ELECTORAL COMPETITION IN TAIWANESE GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1992 
District District Number of "serious" candidates in Total Ratio of the vote 
magnitude excess of k when cutoff is when the number of 
k vote reduces by candidates 
20% 33% 50% k- l st/ l -st k+l st/k-th 
1 1 6  9 9 48 48  0. 1 57 0.965 
2 2 I J 1 5 0.756 0.834 
3 7 4 4 4 1 3  0.489 0.868 
4 2 I I I 7 0.809 0.748 
5 3 I 1 1 1 0  0.960 0.8 1 6  
6 7 0 3 3 1 6  0.753 0.734 
7 7 I 2 2 1 6  0.664 0.870 
8 3 I I I 7 0.588 0.897 
9 4 2 2 2 8 0.835 0.975 
J O  3 2 2 2 6 0.899 0.997 
J I 5 3 4 4 1 J  0.603 0.91 2  
1 2  6 2 2 ·2 1 4  0.554 0.908 
13  5 I I 2 1 J  0.697 0.927 
1 4  J 1 ·r 1 ·7 1 .000 · ·o.597 
1 5  2 2 2 2 8 O.S13 0.998 
1 6  1 I 1 1 3 1 .000 0.926 
1 7  2 I I 2 s 0.770 0.960 
1 8  2 2 2 2 10 0 .673 0.890 
1 9  4 I 1 l 1 J  0.155 0.825 
20 I I 1 1 2 1 .000 0.996 
-
2 1  4 I I 3 1 3  0.694 0.9 12 
22 1 I 1 l 5 1 .000 0.828 
23 I 0 1 1 2 1 .000 0.703 
24 9 3 4 1 3  28 0. 1 85 0.935 
25 9 7 7 1 5  40 0.386 0.939 
26 6 1 l 1 1 4  0.439 0.999 
27  6 2 2 2 1 3  0.569 0.997 
26 
